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THE PASSING-ON DOCTRINE IN ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACTIONS AFTER HANOVER SHOE, ILLINOIS BRICK, AND
PROPOSED REMEDIAL LEGISLATION
Economic passing-on' occurs when direct purchasers from an an-
titrust violator transfer price overcharges or undercharges down the
vertical chain of distribution to injure or aid customers of direct
purchasers who are not in privity with the violator.2 Legal passing-
on questions concern the extent to which an antitrust suit can em-
brace this economic reality. Traditional legal analysis of passing-on
has encompassed the type of evidence admissible to prove passing-
on,' the effect of privity on the ability of the plaintiff to prove
1. Economic passing-on theory has fostered thorough comment. See generally R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST 147-49 (1974); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 389-91 (10th ed. 1976); M. SPENSER,
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 346-50 (2d ed. 1974); Cirace, Price-Fixing, Privity, and the Pass-
On Problem in Antitrust Treble-Damages Suits: A Suggested Solution, 19 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 171 (1977); Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Eco-
nomic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 883 (1976).
Any anticompetitive activity creates supernormal prices resulting in reduced output, dead-
weight losses, and misallocation of resources. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 104-13
(1972); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 8-19 (1970).
In short, passing-on theory attempts to trace the injury flowing in ripple fashion throughout
the vertical chain of distribution that results from the anticompetitive activity. If the demand
for the product of the business that purchases directly from the antitrust violator is totally
inelastic or the supply totally elastic, the direct purchaser can pass the entire illegal over-
charge and escape injury. See, e.g., Cirace, supra, at 180; Schaefer, supra, at 887-906. Con-
versely, if demand is totally elastic or supply totally inelastic, the direct purchaser must
absorb the entire overcharge, and remote purchasers are protected from injury. See, e.g.,
Cirace, supra, at 181; Schaefer, supra, at 887-906. In the majority of markets, however,
elasticities of demand or supply are neither completely elastic nor inelastic; thus, each mem-
ber of the vertical chain of distribution may simultaneously absorb and pass on a portion of
the illegal price. See Cirace, supra, at 181; Schaefer, supra, at 893. In a normal market
purchasers three or four levels of distribution removed from the antitrust violator can be
injured in fact to the extent of the illegal price they absorb. For a more detailed analysis of
the economics of passing-on, including the use of tax incidence theory, the effect of derived
demand, and the profit maximization assumption, see Schaefer, supra, at 887-906.
2. For the purpose of this Note, a purchaser who is in privity of contract with the antitrust
violator is referred to as a direct purchaser, direct customer, or direct buyer. Customers of
direct purchasers who are not in privity of contract with the violator are referred to as
customers, indirect customers, remote customers, indirect purchasers, or remote purchasers.
An intermediary is a direct or indirect purchaser who occupies a position between the anti-
trust violator and the plaintiff or between the violator and the plaintiff's competitor.
3. Experts use several types of evidence to identify instances of passing-on: the statistical
determination of elasticities derived through multiple-regression analysis, used in conjunc-
tion with tax incidence theory; an interrupted time-price series analysis; testimony of the
purchaser on his pricing decision in relation to purchase price and resale price; or a combina-
tion of any of these methods.
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passing-on, and the distinction, if any, between the offensive and
defensive5 use of passing-on.
Unfortunately, the courts and commentators have overlooked an
element of the passing-on question. Past economic and legal anal-
yses have not differentiated between the issues presented by
passing-on in the context of monopolization' or price fixing7 under
the Sherman Act, and the related but separate issues presented
by passing-on in the context of price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act.' Too many similarities exist between Sher-
man and Robinson-Patman cases to ignore the interrelation of adju-
dications of the passing-on issues under the two Acts. For example,
interpretation of the scope of section 4 of the Clayton Act,9 under
which all private antitrust actions must be pleaded, partially deter-
mines the resolution of the passing-on issue in all private enforce-
ment contexts. Although more empirical data may be available in
price discrimination cases to prove passing-on,10 basic similarities
exist between the economic models used to prove passing-on under
the two Acts.
The differences between the issues presented by the Acts, how-
ever, dictate that the passing-on rules developed by the courts and
Congress for Sherman cases should not be applied summarily to
Robinson-Patman cases. Sherman and Robinson-Patman cases dif-
fer in terms of policy considerations and economic characteristics."
Moreover, the ability to present evidence of passing-on is more often
vital to the maintenance of an action under the Robinson-Patman
4. Indirect purchasers have pleaded passing-on offensively to prove they have absorbed the
overcharge and, thereby, have been injured.
5. Antitrust violators have pleaded passing-on defensively to prove that plaintiffs-who
may either be direct or indirect purchasers-have passed the entire overcharge and, thereby,
have escaped injury.
6. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
7. Id. § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
8. Clayton Act § 2, as amended by Robinson-Patman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973). For a
comparison of the different uses of passing-on under the two Acts, see text accompanying
notes 69-87 infra.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973).
10. In price discrimination violations the economist can examine, for example, the effects
of a price increase in the plaintiff's chain of distribution and also the effect of a smaller price
increase in the favored customer's chain of distribution. With price fixing or monopolization
violations the economist can examine only the passing-on of one uniform price granted to all
purchasers.
11. See generally text accompanying notes 69-87 infra.
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Act than under the Sherman Act.' 2
This Note will assess the current status and predict the future
trends of the passing-on doctrine under the Robinson-Patman Act.'3
Because most current developments and debate on the passing-on
doctrine have surfaced in a Sherman Act context, analysis of the
Sherman passing-on issue is a prerequisite to examination of
Robinson-Patman passing-on. After identifying the policies crucial
to the disposition of the passing-on question under the Sherman
Act, the issues presented in Robinson-Patman and Sherman
passing-on will be distinguished to enable assessment of the current
status of passing-on under the Robinson-Patman Act and prediction
of the future trend in price discrimination passing-on.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND PASSING-ON UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Hanover Shoe
The Supreme Court first addressed the passing-on question in a
1968 decision, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. ' 4
In Hanover Shoe, the direct purchasing plaintiff alleged that it had
suffered damage from United Shoe's monopolization of the shoe
machinery market to the extent that its lease payments exceeded
12. For example, a hypothetical rule which asserts that passing-on evidence is inadmissible
would preclude only an indirect purchaser from suing under the Sherman Act. In a price
discrimination context, however, such a rule would preclude a direct purchaser from proving
he was injured by competition with an indirect customer of the discriminator. The direct
purchaser would not be allowed to prove the low price was passed to his competitor. See, e.g.,
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
13. The courts have created uncertainty over the use of passing-on in price discrimination
cases by limited treatment of the issue and by suggested application of Sherman rules to
Robinson-Patman cases. The inquiry into whether a purchaser without privity has a cause
of action under the Robinson-Patman Act has been confined to statutory interpretation. See,
e.g., Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
901 (1969); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956). Because of the erosion of the
doctrine that an indirect purchaser does not have a cause of action unless the discriminator
effectively controls his price, FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 406 F. Supp. 224
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362, 377-
79 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (citing Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140, 1143 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973)), courts soon will have to confront the passing-on issue in a price
discrimination context. Of course, the Supreme Court has allowed a direct plaintiff to prove
passing-on of the favored price to his competitor, Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395
U.S. 642 (1965), but this decision was vague and failed to directly address the passing-on
issues. See notes 121-38 infra & accompanying text.
14. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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the competitive purchase price of the equipment.'5 United defen-
sively pleaded passing-on, arguing that it had not injured Hanover
because Hanover had passed on the overcharge as a higher resale
price without suffering a loss in sales volume. If the overcharge
applied equally to all of the plaintiff's competitors and if the de-
mand for the plaintiff's product was so inelastic that the plaintiff
could increase its price by the amount of the overcharge without
realizing a decline in sales,' 6 United asserted that passing-on should
be a defense. The issue was not whether United had monopolized
the market, because this determination had been made in a pre-
ceeding government action; 7 rather, the question was whether Han-
over could establish injury to its business or property within the
ambit of section 4 of the Clayton Act'8 by showing that it had paid
an illegally high price, without regard to whether it had passed on
the price increase. The Supreme Court rejected the passing-on de-
fense,'9 contrary to the result reached by the majority of courts."
Justice White, speaking for eight Justices on the passing-on issue,
concluded that the policies of deterring antitrust violations by
treble-damage actions2' and of expediting protracted litigation with
a judicially manageable standard22 mandated disallowance of the
15. Id. at 483-84.
16. Id. at 492-63. One of the two requisites created by United Shoe, however, is never
satisfied in a price discrimination suit because in such suits a high price is imposed on the
plaintiff and a low price is granted his competitor; but a uniform high price is never imposed
equally on the plaintiff and all of his competitors.
17. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). A final judgment or
decree in any civil or criminal suit brought under the antitrust laws by the United States is
"prima facie evidence . . . as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto .... " Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)
(1973 & Supp. 1978).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
19. 392 U.S. at 489.
20. E.g., Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1962)
(plaintiffs denied recovery because charges passed-on); see Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick
Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 309, 314
n.21 (1978) (numerous cases cited supporting proposition that prior to Hanover Shoe the
majority of courts allowed defensive passing-on). Moreover, in 1922, the Supreme Court
implied that it would allow a passing-on defense. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S.
156, 165 (1922) ("[nlo court or jury could say that, if the rate had been lower, ... the...
advantage would have accrued to [the plaintiff]").
21. 392 U.S. at 494.
22. If passing-on were allowed as a defense, antitrust defendants frequently would seek to
establish its applicability. "Treble-damage actions would often require additional long and
complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories." Id. at 493.
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passing-on defense. Unless treble-damage actions by direct pur-
chasers were encouraged, violators would retain the fruits of their
illegality because ultimate consumers would be unlikely to sue.2
Justice White also was concerned that approval of defensive
passing-on would hamper the judicial administration of the anti-
trust laws because the difficulty of establishing defensive passing-
on was more burdensome in the "real" economic world than in the
economist's hypothetical model:24 businessmen cannot account for
their price decisions;2 cost data is elusive;6 and finally, even if the
defendant established passing-on, the plaintiff could allege that it
would have raised its resale price, absent the overcharge, and would
have maintained the same level of sales with an increase in its profit
margin.2 Aside from these practical difficulties, Justice White con-
tended that defendants eager to establish defensive passing-on
would thrust the courts into a complicated, theoretical, and time-
consuming process of proof.2 Therefore, the Court decided that de-
fensive passing-on would be permitted only if proof of passing-on
could be established easily, as in the instance of a pre-existing cost-
plus contract.2 19
The Court's holding in Hanover Shoe was the first indication that
the consideration of the difficulty of proof should take precedence
over the policy of deterrence. Nevertheless, after Hanover Shoe,
many courts0 and commentators" believed that the offensive use of
passing-on remained a viable theory in antitrust litigation because
offensive passing-on forwarded the goal of deterrence.
23. Id. at 494.
24. Id. at 493.
25. Id. at 492-93.
26. Id. at 493.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 494. A cost-plus contract is one which fixes the amount to be paid the contractor
on a basis, generally, of the cost of the material and labor, plus an agreed percentage thereof.
The Spica, 289 F. 436, 445 (C.C.A.N.Y. 1923).
30. See note 32 infra for cases upholding the offensive use of passing-on after Hanover Shoe.
31. E.g., McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Re-
cover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. RE,. 1977 (1971); Schaefer, supra
note 1; Note, Mangano and Ultimate Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover
Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 394 (1972); Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive
Use of the Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 98 (1972); Note, Standing to Sue in
Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 976, 988-90 (1975). But
see Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae
and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 638-49 (1976).
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Illinois Brick
Nine years after Hanover Shoe, conflict among the circuits over
the offensive use of passing-on" forced the Supreme Court to resolve
the controversy by invalidating all forms of passing-on. In Illinois
Brick v. Illinois,33 the State of Illinois and local government units
alleged that manufacturers of concrete block conspired to fix
prices.34 Most plaintiffs had to allege that general and masonry
contractors passed on the overcharges to them in the form of higher
building costs, because these plaintiffs were not in privity with the
antitrust violators. The district court granted the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment against the indirect purchasers because
these plaintiffs' injuries were too remote to confer standing. 5 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that otherwise the compensatory
goal of section 4 of the Clayton Act would be emasculated.36 The
Supreme Court did not reach the standing issue37 but concluded in
32. Many courts have upheld the offensive use of passing-on, stressing deterrence objec-
tives, noting that privity is not required in antitrust suits, and de-emphasizing problems of
proof and apportionment of damages. E.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, [1977-
11 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,434 (D.D.C. 1977); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp.,
395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill.
1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn.
1973), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975). Other courts rejected the offensive use of
passing-on because it encouraged the massive evidence and complicated theories spumed by
the Court in Hanover Shoe. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438
F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 73
F.R.D. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., [1972] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
74,235 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Travis v. Fairmount Foods Co., 346 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
33. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
34. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
35. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (court noted that ultimate
consumers, consumers who purchase product in form other than that sold by violator, rarely
are conferred standing).
36. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976) (difficult proof should not
deny injured party standing).
37. "[Tlhe question of which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for
purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained
injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4." 431 U.S. at 728 n.7;
see Handler & Bleckman, supra note 31, at 644-45. The analysis of the Court, however, belied
this statement. The Court ignored evidence that § 4 permitted actions by indirect purchasers,
see notes 53-56 infra & accompanying text, and resorted to an analysis of the difficulties of
proving passing-on to determine effectively the standing of indirect purchasers.
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an opinion 3 written by Justice White that indirect plaintiffs could
not introduce evidence that they were injured within the meaning
of section 4.19
The Court could have overruled Hanover Shoe, narrowly limited
it, or applied it to bar offensive passing-on 0 Justice White stated
that limiting Hanover Shoe to defensive passing-on would expose
defendants to multiple liability and inconsistent adjudications.4 1
The concern in Hanover Shoe with further encumbering treble-
damage actions with massive evidence and complicated theories
applied equally to offensive and defensive passing-on. 2 The major-
ity also felt that the rationale of Hanover Shoe and stare decisis
militated against overruling the earlier decision.43 The Court hy-
38. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.
431 U.S. at 748.
39. Id. at 728-29.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 730. Justice White feared that if offensive, but not defensive, passing-on were
allowed, a direct purchaser could recover automatically the full overcharge after an indirect
purchaser had proved passing-on and recovered a portion of the overcharge. The dissenters
did not share this fear. Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Delaying recovery until the
possibility of duplicative suits is foreclosed or apportioning damages would allay the fears of
the majority. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 221-31 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court].
42. The same methods used to prove passing-on defensively are used to demonstrate offen-
sive use; however, this evidence is not necessarily massive and complicated. Complete
passing-on can be assumed if "a price-fixed product is used by an intermediate purchaser as
a component of a final product [and] . ..represents a small portion of the final product's
price, and if substitution for the component is difficult . .. " Schaefer, supra note 1, at 921.
The Court, however, spurned attempts to carve out exceptions for particular types of markets,
such as the component part market, because "classifying various market situations according
to the amount of pass-on likely to be involved and its susceptibility of proof in a judicial forum
would entail the very problem that the Hanover Shoe rule was meant to avoid." 431 U.S. at
744-45. Nevertheless, the Court did carve out two exceptions if market forces were su-
perseded. See text accompanying note 45 infra. Even if assumptions of passing-on for particu-
lar markets are not allowed, proof of passing-on does not manifest an onerous burden. See
generally Schaefer, supra note 1. Antitrust litigation has always been complex and costly.
Withrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 1 (1976). The Court in Illinois Brick exaggerated the margin of complexity and costliness
added by the injection of passing-on into the litigation formula. The Court also was wary of
compounding the "uncertainty of how much of an overcharge could be established at trial"
with the "uncertainty of how that overcharge would be apportioned among the various plain-
tiffs." 431 U.S. at 745. This concern, although applicable to price-fixing or monopolization
cases, has no validity in a price discrimination context because a comparison of prices charged
rather than a calculation of a theoretical competitive price yields the overcharge. See text
accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
43. 431 U.S. at 736.
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pothesized that if it overruled Hanover Shoe to allow offensive and
defensive passing-on, procedural rules could not regulate satisfacto-
rily the resulting multiple litigation." Failing to overrule or limit
Hanover Shoe, the prohibition against defensive passing-on was ex-
tended to offensive passing-on. In dictum, the Court stated that the
possible application of passing-on may be permitted only if a pre-
existing cost-plus contract provided the mechanism for establishing
passing-on or if a direct purchaser was controlled by his customer,
two situations in which passing-on could be easily established or
assumed."
Justice White emphasized avoiding complex legal actions and
protecting defendants from multiple liability at the expense of com-
pensating injured indirect plaintiffs." He believed that antitrust
laws were more likely to be enforced if direct purchasers could re-
cover the full overcharge.47 From a deterrence standpoint, according
to Justice White, it did not matter if the injured party sued, as long
as the violation was redressed by someone.48 The dissenters, how-
ever, maintained that the decision emasculated the paramount de-
terrence objective of Hanover Shoe.4" Justice Brennan believed that
the decrease in claims by the now precluded indirect purchasers
would more than offset any possible increase in actions brought by
direct purchasers seeking the full overcharge. 0 Accordingly, prob-
lems of proof and multiple liability were less significant to Justice
Brennan than redress of injured parties and deterrence of antitrust
violations."'
Justice White's analysis focused upon the proper balance of con-
44. Id.
45. See notes 127-31 infra & accompanying text.
46. Because "a price-fixing agreement is more likely for a product that is subject to inelas-
tic demand because greater profits can be exacted under such market condition. . ... Schae-
fer, supra note 1, at 898, the results in Illinois Brick often totally frustrate the compensation
policy.
47. The direct purchaser is in a stronger financial position to bring suit than his generally
smaller customers and may have greater incentive to do so if he can recove the full overcharge
even though he has not been injured. Note, Antitrust Law-Private Actions: The Supreme
Court Bars Treble-Damage Suits by Indirect Purchasers, 56 N.C.L. REv. 341, 351 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Antitrust Law]. Alternatively, the direct purchaser may be unwilling
to destroy his business relationship with the violator if he has not suffered injury. In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919
(1974).
48. 431 U.S. at 746.
49. Id. at 749-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 748-61.
51. Id. at 758-65.
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flicting antitrust policies and goals,5" but virtually ignored evidence
that Congress had intended section 4 of the Clayton Act to embrace
injuries to indrect purchasers. 3 The dissenters cited54 the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 as evidence of a
Congressional intent contrary to the holding of the majority.
52. One commentator asserts,
Total accommodation of these conflicting policies, however, is virtually im-
possible. Compensating injured parties, for example, often is incompatible with
a manageable legal standard because of theoretical problems in the economic
analysis of a damage award. In a pass-on situation, this analysis is complicated
further because a monopolistic overcharge has cumulatively larger effects as it
occurs farther back in the chain of production and distribution. Similarly, the
practical problem of measuring the injuries plaintiffs suffer in specific instances
is nearly insoluble. If courts emphasize deterrence, however, the remedy should
be available to the party best able to assert it; thus, deterrence is not necessarily
compatible with compensation. If the protection of defendants from multiple
liability and the definition of a manageable legal standard are primary concerns,
that is, if courts follow a privity rule, compensation and deterrence assuredly
will suffer.
Cirace, supra note 1, at 174.
53. The legislative history of § 7 of the 1890 Sherman Act, the precursor of § 4 of the
Clayton Act, indicates that Congress intended that parties not in privity with the violator be
entitled to a cause of action. Senator George observed that individual consumers were the
parties primarily protected by the Act:
The right of action against the persons in the combination is given to the party
damnified. Who is the party injured, when, as prescribed in the bill, there has
been an advance in the price by the combination? The answer is found in the
bill itself in the words, "intended to advance the cost to the consumer of any
such articles." The consumer is the party "damnified or injured . .. .
Who are the consumers? The people of the United States as individuals;
whatever each individual consumes, or his family, marks the amount of his
interest in the price advanced by the combination.
21 CONG. REC. 1767, 1768 (1899). Senator George was not referring simply to consumers who
had purchased directly from the violator. He recognized passing-on of overcharges from
middlemen to consumers:
An advance in price to the middlemen is not mentioned in the bill, for the
obvious reason that no such advance would damnify them; it would rather be a
benefit, as it would increase the value of the goods he has on hand. He buys to
sell again. He buys only for profit on a subsequent sale. So whatever he pays he
receives when he sells, together with a profit on his investment; and so all of
them incuding the last, who sells directly to the consumer. The consumer,
therefore, paying all the increased price advanced by the middlemen and profits
on the same, is the party necessarily damnified or injured.
Id. at 1767.
Interestingly, six months before Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court, in an unanimous deci-
sion, observed that § 4 was conceived of primarily as a remedy for consumers. Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977); see Report of the Senate
Judiciary Comm. accompanying S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11-14 (1978).
54. 431 U.S. at 754-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15c-15h (West Supp. 1978). One commentator has predicted that
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The Congressional Response to Illinois Brick
The judiciary committees of the Senate" and House of Repre-
sentatives" also have found the majority's opinion in Illinois Brick
and the broader language of Hanover Shoe to be contrary to the
proper scheme of private enforcement of the antitrust laws and have
proposed overruling legislation. As reported by the Senate bill, the
proposed Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1978 mandates that parties
to an action brought under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act
may establish offensive or defensive passing-on. 8 The new law
would apply retroactively to the date of the decision in Illinois
Brick. 9 The Act leaves unaltered the laws of standing, proximate
cause, speculative damages, and the type of evidence used to prove
passing-on, because the drafters believed that those issues could be
developed best by courts on a case-by-case basis. 0 The Act merely
eliminates the artificial prerequisite of privity.6 '
The pending legislation alters the balance of the antitrust policies
established in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe.12 The proponents of
the holding in Illinois Brick will not nullify the Act's creation of paren patrie suits brought
by attorney generals for indirect consumers because "[rieports of both houses as well as the
remarks of one bill's principal sponsers leaves no doubt that the Congress contemplated...
suits on behalf of indirect purchasers . . . ." The Supreme Court, supra note 41, at 230
(footnotes omitted). However, the prevailing opinion is that Illinois Brick seriously undercut
parens patrie suits. See S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-17 (1978).
56. S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
57. H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
58. The Act provides:
SEC. 3. The Clayton Act is amended by inserting immediately after section
44 the following new section:
SEC 41(1) In any action under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act,
the fact that a person or the United States has not dealt directly with the
defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit recovery.
(2) In any action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the defendant shall
be entitled to prove as partial or complete defense to a damage" claim,
that the plaintiff has passed on to others, who are themselves entitled to
recover under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act, some or all of what would
otherwise constitute plaintiff's damage.
S. REP. No. 934, supra note 55, at 36.
59. The amendment made by the Act applies "to any action commenced under sections 4,
4A, or 4C(a)(1) of the Clayton Act which was pending on June 9, 1977, or filed thereafter."
Id. The constitutionality of the retroactive application of the Act has been questioned. S. REP.
No. 934, supra note 55, pt. 2, at 10-14.
60. Id. pt. 1, at 24.
61. Id.
62. See generally Hoffman, Antitrust Standing: Congress Responds to Illinois Brick, 1978
WASH. U. L.Q. 529; Note, Recovery By Indirect Purchasers: Illinois Brick and the Congres-
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the Act view Justice White's fear of complicated and protracted
proof of passing-on as exaggerated or subordinate to the right of
injured indirect parties to redress their wrongs. The Act concurs
with Justice Brennan's belief that the Illinois Brick rule would lead
to less effective deterrence of antitrust violations, 3 while respecting
Justice White's concern with multiple liabilty and inconsistent
judgments by permitting a defendant to plead passing-on defen-
sively in some situations;' however if a defendant could not estab-
lish that he was in danger of being sued by the indirect party injured
in fact, the direct purchaser could recover the entire overcharge.
It is better that the -direct purchaser who passes on a portion of the
overcharge recoup a windfall than that the violator retain the fruits
of his illegality. Moreover, if the defendant established passing-on
defensively, the injured indirect party could be able to use this
finding against the defendant in a later suit under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.6
THE CASE AGAINST SUMMARY APPLICATION OF SHERMAN PASSING-ON
RULES TO ROBINSON-PATMAN CASES
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,67 Illinois
Brick v. Illinois,6" and the legislation proposed to counter Illinois
Brick all identified the following policies as crucial to the disposition
of the passing-on question under the Sherman Act: deterrence of
antitrust violations, expedition of protracted litigation with a judi-
cially manageable standard, protection of defendants from multiple
liability, and compensation of injured parties. Although each of
these recent Sherman Act developments underscored identical pol-
icy considerations, all three of these interpretations of the law estab-
lished a different balance of the policies because total accommoda-
tion of these conflicting considerations was impossible." Courts will
be tempted to summarily apply Sherman Act passing-on rules to
Robinson-Patman Act cases because private enforcement actions
under both Acts must proceed under section 4 of the Clayton Act,
sional Response, 39 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 537 (1978).
63. S. REP. No. 934, supra note 55, pt. 1, at 18-23.
64. Id. at 25. If the party to whom the overcharge was passed is not entitled to recover,
however, defensive passing-on cannot be pleaded. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., United States v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962).
67. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
68. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
69. See note 52 supra.
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the section under which Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick were de-
cided and under which the proposed legislation is to be enacted.
Although section 4 applies equally to both acts, the Robinson-
Patman Act's distinct economic and legal characteristics create
unique policy considerations that should be examined in the deter-
mination and application of Robinson-Patman Act passing-on rules.
Passing-on in a Robinson-Patman action serves two purposes.
First, passing-on can demonstrate that an indirect purchaser has
received a price favor. 0 In this context, passing-on establishes the
causal nexus between a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act and
an injury.71 The finder of fact must determine that the price favor
passed to the indirect purchasing competitor to establish cause-in-
fact,72 and the judge must decide that passing-on can be used to
establish proximate cause. Second, passing-on is used to measure
damages in Robinson-Patman Act cases.73
The Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act causes of action use
passing-on for different purposes. First, in Sherman Act cases,
passing-on determines whether a plaintiff purchasing indirectly re-
ceived an overcharge. However, under a statutory interpretation of
the Robinson-Patman Act, the plaintiff who has purchased indi-
rectly may not prove that a high price was passed on to him because
only direct purchasers may sue in price discrimination actions.74
This same plaintiff, however, must use passing-on to prove that his
competitor received a discriminatorily low price if the competitor
did not purchase directly from the violator. Second, if offensive
passing-on were allowed, the Sherman Act plaintiff would use
passing-on to allocate damages between parties in the vertical chain
of distribution and himself. Because only the direct purchaser can
sue under the Robinson-Patman Act, the use of passing-on to allo-
70. See notes 113-38 infra & accompanying text.
71. Passing-on establishes only one element of the causal nexus. Other elements include
showing that the disfavored purchaser could not have acquired a lower price; that the price
difference of a component significantly affected the resale price of the finished product,
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 151 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951); that the price
difference created a competitive advantage, Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1967);
and that there was actual competition.
72. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
73. See notes 139-61 infra & accompanying text. For a general discussion of recovery of
damages for violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, see Seplaki, The Economics of Treble
Damages Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 31 RuroERs L. REV. 167 (1978).
74. See notes 162-78 infra & accompanying text.
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cate general damages is unnecessary. In a price discrimination suit
brought pursuant to the Robinson-Patman Act, however, passing-
on is necessary in order to measure consequential damages. In Sher-
man Act cases, only general damages are demonstrable; therefore,
passing-on is not needed to measure damages. Because passing-on
policies relate dissimilarly to these two distinct legal schemes, Sher-
man Act passing-on rules should not be applied summarily to
Robinson-Patman Act price-discrimination cases.
One policy reason for the result in Illinois Brice was the necessity
of protecting defendants from the multiple liability that would re-
sult if all purchasers in the vertical chain of distribution could assert
passing-on offensively but violators were not allowed to assert the
same theory defensively. This policy is invalid in a price discrimina-
tion context because the traditional interpretation of the statutory
language of the Robinson-Patman Act is that an indirect purchaser
generally does not have a cause of action.76 Therefore, only one
potential plaintiff, the direct purchaser, threatens the price discrim-
inator with liability. Consequently, a price discriminator would
never face multiple liability or inconsistent adjudications even if
offensive, but not defensive, passing-on were allowed. 7
The price-discrimination plaintiff does not need passing-on to
prove he received an illegally high price because generally he must
purchase directly from the discriminator.7" This plaintiff, hovever,
must use passing-on if his competitor did not purchase directly from
the antitrust violator to prove that his competitor received an unjus-
tified price favor through an intermediary. If a direct purchasing
victim of a price discrimination who is injured by competition with
an indirect purchasing competitor was not allowed to prove the
pass-on, antitrust violations would be encouraged and the deter-
rence policy frustrated because the violator could insulate himself
from liability simply by selling to an intermediary who was not in
competition with the injured party. The plaintiff could not sue for
the favor granted the intermediary because the two parties were not
competitors," and he could sue for the favor flowing to his competi-
75. See notes 139-61 infra & accompanying text.
76. For a more complete analysis, see notes 162-79 infra & accompanying text.
77. If plaintiffs without privity were allowed to sue under the Robinson-Patman Act, and
if offensive but not defensive passing-on were allowed, then the defendant would be exposed
to multiple liability or inconsistent adjudications. For cases holding that remote plaintiffs can
sue, see notes 177-79 infra & accompanying text.
78. See notes 162-79 infra & accompanying text.
79. See note 97 infra & accompanying text.
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tor only if passing-on were allowed. Thus, the Illinois Brick rule
would preclude even a direct purchasing plaintiff injured by an
indirect purchasing competitor from suing under the Robinson-
Patman Act. Abrogation of the deterrence policy does not occur in
a similar Sherman Act situation because the direct purchasing
Sherman Act plaintiff never has to prove passing-on to his indirect
purchasing competitor.
The policy reasons articulated in Illinois Brick for denying a
plaintiff suing under the Sherman Act the right to prove the
passing-on of an overcharge should not apply to a plaintiff suing
under the Robinson-Patman Act, who seeks to prove that a favora-
ble price discrimination was passed on to his competitor. Passing-
on in the context of price discrimination would not expose the defen-
dant to multiply liability and would aid, rather than hinder, the
policy of deterring antitrust violations.
Passing-on also is used in Robinson-Patman Act cases to measure
damages. The Court in Illinois Brick believed that allowing proof of
passing-on in Sherman Act cases would result in an unacceptable
judicial standard of damages because the "uncertainty of how much
of an overcharge could be established at trial" would be com-
pounded with the "uncertainty of how that overcharge would be
apportioned among the various plaintiffs. ' 8 This argument is irrele-
vant in a price-discrimination context. An overcharge is difficult to
measure in Sherman Act cases because the court must engage in a
complex and theoretical analysis designed to predict the price that
would have been charged if the defendant had not violated the
antitrust laws.' In Robinson-Patman Act cases, however, the over-
charge is not difficult to measure because it equals the difference
between the high and low price granted by the discriminator.
Moreover, apportionment of damages in Robinson-Patman Act
cases is not required, and consequently passing-on is used for this
purpose, because only one plaintiff, the direct purchaser, may sue.82
Furthermore, allocating damages among plaintiffs in the chain of
80. 431 U.S. at 745. See also note 42 supra.
81. See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). One author suggests that this uncertainty precipitated a
liberal proof of damages because "the defendant's violation almost inevitably makes it
impossible to know with precision what 'might have been' in the absence of a violation."
ANTTRUST ADvIsER 761 (2d ed. C. Hills ed. 1978).
82. See notes 162-79 infra & accompanying text.
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distribution is conceptually distinct from measuring the total
amount of damages. In Sherman Act cases, damages equal the total
amount of the overcharge.8 3 In those circuits following this general
damages rule in Robinson-Patman Act cases, 4 passing-on is used
solely to measure the price favor actually received by the indirect
purchasing plaintiff's competitor.8 5 The price favor received
equals the damages. The use of passing-on to measure general
damages should be allowed because it represents the best balance
between accuracy and efficiency. The uncertainty argument ad-
vanced by the Court in Illinois Brick is inapplicable because
passing-on under the Robinston-Patman Act is not used to allocate
damages, and because the amount of the discrimination is deter-
mined more easily and accurately than the amount of the over-
charge.
In those circuits that measure damages under the Robinson-
Patman Act by the loss of profits instead of by the amount of price
discrimination," proof of passing-on has been complex and has led
to protracted litigation .8 Because the policy of expediting complex
and protracted litigation applies to the consequential damage for-
mula, the rule in Illinois Brick should eliminate the use of the conse-
quential measure of damages.
CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS OF PASSING-ON IN TREBLE-
DAMAGE ACTIONS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Background of the Price Discrimination Action
The Robinson-Patman Act and its predecessor, the original sec-
tion 2 of the Clayton Act, 8 condemned different forms of price dis-
crimination. The drafters of the old section 2 sought to protect com-
petitors of the discriminating seller from predatory geographical
83. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906). Although this general damage formula is theoretically
simple, it is often difficult to apply because of the uncertainties inherent in predicting the
competitive legal price. See note 81 supra. This uncertainty is not present in price discrimina-
tion cases if the general damage formula is used because the damage 'equals the difference'
between the high and low price charged by the discriminator.
84. See notes 137-42 infra & accompanying text.
85. See notes 139-61 infra & accompanying text.
86. For a listing of cases requiring consequential damages in price discrimination actions,
see note 149 infra.
87. See notes 139-61 infra & accompanying text.
88. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
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price discrimination. Congress believed that multimarket firms,
such as Standard Oil Company and American Tobacco Company,
would charge unprofitable prices in competitive markets to drive
their rivals out of business, while recouping their losses by charging
high prices in markets in which they possessed monopoly power."
In the 1920's and early 1930's, a new form of injurious price dis-
crimination emerged. Chain stores with mass buying power were
demanding and receiving purchase discounts in excess of those
mandated by economic efficiency and were passing on the savings
as lower resale prices. 0 This form of price discrimination did not
injure the competitors of discriminating sellers as much as it injured
the disfavored persons who purchased from the discriminating sell-
ers and competed with the favored purchasers. The Robinson-
Patman Act,9 amending the original section 2, attempted to redress
this new level of competitive injury. Congressman Patman stated
that the bill was "designed to accomplish what so far the Clayton
Act has only weakly attempted, namely to protect the independent
merchant, the public whom he serves and the manufacturer from
whom he buys from exploitation by his chain competitor.""2 If the
purpose of the Act was to protect independent merchants, many of
whom purchased indirectly through wholesalers, and the public,
who are invariably indirect purchasers, the drafters must have con-
templated actions by indirect purchasers using the passing-on doc-
trine. Rational lawmakers would not define a class to be protected
by an act and then deny certain members of that class the means
to redress their injury.
The Robinson-Patman Act allows an injured party or the govern-
ment to sue the discriminator, and even the favored buyer, if the
buyer knowingly induces or receives a discrimination prohibited by
the Act.13 The Act also prohibits the granting of discriminatory false
brokerage94 or allowances, services, and facilities. 5 The most impor-
89. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1914).
90. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936); 80 CONG. REC. 6621, 7324,
7887, 8104 (1936); cf. FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATIONS, S. Doc. No. 4,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
92. 79 CONG. REC. 9078 (1936).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1973 & Supp. 1978) (amending Clayton Act § 2(a)).
94. Id. § 13(b) (amending Clayton Act § 2(c)). The brokerage clause claim does not require
demonstration of competitive impact and does not permit legal justification. Id.
95. Id. 99 13d-13e (amending Clayton Act §§ 2(d), (e)). The seller may not make payments
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tant prohibition, however, is against price discrimination. Section
2(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodi-
ties of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, de-
stroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them .... 11
The injury must be to competition; thus, the injured party must
compete on the same functional level as the recipient of the favored
price.9  For example, a "discount granted to .. . wholesalers
[would] not injure retailers who received no equivalent price reduc-
tion, since they [do] not compete for the consumer's business.""8
The Act embraces injury to at least four levels of competition:
primary-line'injury to competitors of the discriminator;9 secondary-
line injury to competitors of the discriminator's purchaser; 100 third-
line injury to competitors of the customer of the discriminator's
purchaser;' and fourth-line injury to competitors of the customer
of the customer of the discriminator's purchaser. 02 Although the
competitor of the plaintiff is not required to be in privity with the
to or otherwise furnish services, allowances, or facilities for the benefit of his customer unless
such consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all competing customers. Id.
96. Id. § 13(a) (amending Clayton act § 2(a)).
97. See, e.g., FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); Tri Valley Packing Ass'n v.
FTC, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964); Doubleday, 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955).
98. Doubleday, 52 F.T.C. at 207-08.
99. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Borden Co. v.
FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964).
100. See, e.g., National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F,2d 517 (7th Cir. 1968) (presump-
tion of injury arises from systematic, substantial, and sustained discrimination); Moog
Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956) (relation of size of discounts and profit margin
to injury); Standard Motor Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959).
101. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). In Meyer the Court stated that
if it "read 'customer' as excluding retailers who buy through wholesalers and compete with
direct buyers, it would frustrate the purpose" of the Act. Id. at 352. Thus, the Court held
that a customer who received the benefit of discrimination as regulated by the Act included
direct and indirect purchasers. Id. at 356-57. Although the Court in Meyer was interpreting
§ 2(d), the same analysis applies to § 2(a). Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642
(1969).
102. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
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discriminator, the traditional interpretation of section 2(a) requires
the plaintiff to be in privity. 103
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person injured by
acts prohibited by the-antitrust laws, including subsections (a),104
(c),'"5 (d),'10 (e),'10 and (f) 0s of section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act,
may sue to recover threefold the damages sustained, plus the rea-
sonable cost of the suit.' The plaintiff in a private enforcement
action must prove actual injury to competition,"0 whereas the gov-
ernment need only prove that the discrimination may substantially
lessen competition."' The private plaintiff must prove a violation of
the Act, injury to his business or property, a causal nexus between
the violation and the injury,"' 2 and measurable damages.
Passing-On in the Competitor's Line of Distribution
Passing-on in cases brought under the Sherman and Robinson-
Patman, Acts can establish the causal nexus between a violation of
either Act and "the fact of legal injury.""' ' 3 The Sherman Act plain-
103. See notes 162-79 infra & accompanying text.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1973 & Supp. 1978) (amending Clayton Act § 2(a)) (price discrimi-
nation).
105. Id. § 13(c) (amending Clayton Act § 2(c)) (brokerage).
106. Id. § 13(d) (amending Clayton Act § 2(d)) (prohibits discriminatory payments for
services or facilities).
107. Id. § 13(e) (amending Clayton Act § 2(e)) (prohibits discriminatory services or facili-
ties directly provided).
108. Id. § 13(f) (amending Clayton Act § 2(f)) (buyer liability for receipt of discrimina-
tions).
109. A violation of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), is not a violatiohi
of the Clayton Act and does not give rise to a private action. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation
Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
110. See note 111 infra.
111. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (articulated reasonable possibility test
that allows court to rely on broad inference of adverse competitive effects based on price
difference). But see Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury Under the Robinson-Patman
Act: The Concept of "Competitive Advantage" 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1975).
112. See note 119 infra.
113. While injury and damages are the same, the differences between injury and damages
must be kept in mind.
The plaintiff must prove the fact of legal injury with certainty, or to state it in
conventional tort language, the plaintiff is required to establish with reasonable
probability the existence of some causal connection between the defendant's
wrongful act and some loss of anticipated revenue. When the fact of legal injury
has been established-with certainty, then a different standard of proof is applied
as to the amount of damages.
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tiff must prove that he absorbed the overcharge; under the tradi-
tional interpretation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,",
the plaintiff need not assert offensive passing-on because only a
direct purchaser is entitled to press a claim of price discrimination.
A passing-on issue does arise, however, if the price-discrimination
plaintiff is injured by competition with the customer of a favored
purchaser, a third-line injury, or by competition with the customer
of a customer of a favored purchaser, a fourth-line injury. In this
context, the plaintiff must prove that his competitor received the
price favor.
In Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,"5 the Supreme Court was presented
with the issues of the validity of third-line suits and the use of
passing-on; however, it failed to address either question.'" The
Court later permitted third-line actions in FTC v. Fred Meyer,
Inc.," 7 but did not discuss passing-on because the issue could be
avoided on the limited facts of the case."' Then, in Perkins v. Stan-
dard Oil Co. of California,"9 the Court implicitly allowed passing-
Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions
Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231, 236-37 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
114. See notes 162-79 infra & accompanying text.
115. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
116. Standard of Indiana sold gasoline at favored prices to wholesalers who passed a por-
tion of the savings to retailers. The third-line and passing-on issues were avoided because the
Court held that Standard had a right under § 2(b) of the Clayton Act to establish a "meeting
competition" defense. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in FTC v. Standard Oil Co.,
355 U.S. 396 (1958), after Standard had established the defense on remand.
117. 390 U.S. 341 (1968). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Note, The FTC and
Promotional Allowances: The Fred Meyer Quagmire, 55 VA. L. REV. 718, 734-61 (1969).
118. Meyer, a supermarket chain, induced its direct suppliers to grant discriminatory
promotional allowances. Meyer competed with indirect customers of the suppliers who, be-
cause of size, were forced to purchase through wholesalers. Thus, Meyer's customers, and not
Meyer, constituted the third line of competition. The Court held that customers protected
by the Act included retailers who buy through wholesalers and compete with direct buyers,
because a more limited reading of the Act would frustrate its purpose. 390 U.S. at 352.
Although Meyer was decided under the section banning discriminatory promotional allow-
ances, Robinson-Patman Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1973 & Supp. 1978) (amending
Clayton Act § 2(d)), Meyer effectively sanctioned third-level suits brought for price discrimi-
nation under § 2(a) because the scope of protection under § 2(a) is broader than that under
§ 2(d). 390 U.S. at 356-57. Passing-on was not in issue in this case because the promotional
allowance was granted directly to Meyer and the disfavored indirect buyers or their wholesal-
ers did not receive any promotion.
119. 395 U.S. 642 (1969); see Bridges, Price Discrimination Trends Under Perkins v. Stan-
dard Oil Co. and Fred Meyer, Inc., 3 Loy. L. REV. 84 (1970); Note, Liability for "Fourth
Level"Injury Falls Within the Scope of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act-Perkins v. Standard
Oil Company of California, 68 MICH. L. Rav. 773 (1970).
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on and explicitly permitted fourth-level suits.
Perkins, decided in 1969, afforded the Court a new opportunity
to address the passing-on issue. Perkins, an independent service
station operator, purchased most of his gasoline directly from Stan-
dard Oil. Standard also sold gas at an illegally lower price directly
to its own branded dealers who were in competition with Perkins,
and to Signal Oil & Gas, which was not in competition with Perkins.
Signal then passed the price favor to its subsidiary, Western Hyway
Oil, and Western Hyway passed the price favor to its subsidiary,
Regal Stations, a competitor of Perkins. Thus, Perkins sustained a
fourth-line injury by competing with a customer, Regal, of a cus-
tomer, Western Hyway, of one who knowingly received the benefit
of the price discrimination granted by Signal.1 2 The issue was
whether Regal was too remote from Standard for Perkins to estab-
lish a causal nexus. The district court determined that Regal and
Standard were not too remote to establish the causal nexus. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Regal
and Standard were too remote.' 2 ' The Supreme Court held that it
was immaterial that Regal was two intermediaries removed from
Standard if the plaintiff could establish cause-in-fact. 22
Perkins only implicitly sanctioned the use of offensive passing-on.
The issue directly addressed by the Court was whether a plaintiff
suing under section 2(a) had a cause of action for an injury resulting
from competition with a customer of a customer of one who know-
ingly receives the benefit of a price favor. Section 2(a)1 23 prohibits
third-line discrimination resulting in a plaintiffs injury from com-
petition with a customer of one who knowingly receives the benefit
120. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
121. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1968). The Court of appeals
did find that Standard was liable under two other counts: injury at the wholesale level and
injury at the retail level resulting from Standard's direct discriminatory sales to its branded
dealers.
122. 395 U.S. at 648.
123. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973 & Supp. 1978) (amending Clayton
Act § 2(a)), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, .... either directly
or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodi-
ties of like grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them . . ..
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of a discrimination,' - but the statute does not explicitly prohibit
fourth-line discrimination that is passed through an additional in-
termediary to the plaintiffs competitor. Justice Black, writing for
the majority in Perkins, stated that a literal interpretation of section
2(a), limiting a cause of action to third-line injury, would be artifi-
cial and unwarranted by the purposes of the Act: "[T]o read
'customer' more narrowly. . . would allow price discriminators to
avoid the sanctions of the Act by the simple expedient of adding an
additional lin~k to the distribution chain."' The dissenting Justices
did not adopt the fourth-line concept. They felt that Perkins could
redress his injury only because Signal, Western Hyway, and Regal
were members of a controlled group; thus the dissenters viewed
the entire group as second-level competitors. 2
The Court in Perkins failed to address passing-on or to cite its
previous decision in Hanover Shoe. The majority decided simply
that section 2(a) encompassed a fourth-line suit and automatically
allowed whatever proof, presumably including passing-on, that was
necessary to establish the.causal nexus. If the Court had disallowed
proof of passing-on, it would have negated the section's intended
sanction of fourth-line suits; without proof of passing-on a plaintiff
could not establish that his indirect purchasing competitor received
a price favor. Similarly, passing-on is necessary in third-line suits
to prove that the indirect purchasing competitor received a price
favor. Because the express language of section 2(a) clearly creates
third-line actions and these suits require proof of passing-on, the use
of this doctrine to prove Robinson-Patman Act violations should not
be at issue in third or fourth-line suits. Disallowance of passing-on
would insulate a discriminator from liability in third or fourth-line
suits because a plaintiff would be unable to prove the causal nexus
between a violation of the Act and injury if he could not prove the
price favor inured to the benefit of his comptitor. Because of the
demonstrated need to deter third and fourth-line illegal price favors,
and because multiple suits are not a consideration in price-
discrimination claims, Illinois Brick should be inapplicable to price-
discrimination actions.
Before Illinois Brick, the lower courts could have viewed Perkins
as an enlightened trend toward liberalized passing-on rules and as
124. See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
125. 395 U.S. at 647.
126. Id. at 651 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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a sign that the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that the
passing-on doctrine should take into account the difference between
the legal and economic characteristics of Sherman Act and
Robinson-Patman Act cases. This view arguably is now incorrect if
Illinois Brick is viewed as an attempt to mesh the passing-on rules
developed for Sherman Act cases with those developed for
Robinson-Patman Act cases. The dissenters in Perkins noted that
the action was allowed only because intermediaries controlled Per-
kins' competitor. Thus, whether actual passing-on occurred in that
artificial situation was irrelevant because the competitor would re-
coup the benefit of the price discrimination either directly through
the pass-on or indirectly through the increased profits of his parent
corporations.127
In a footnote to Illinois Brick, the Court arguably adopted the
dissenters' position in Perkins. Declaring that the controlled-group
context, like the cost-plus contract situation, constituted a possible
exception to the normal passing-on rules, the Court noted that
"where market forces are superseded," passing-on could be as-
sumed.'2 This cryptic footnote 29 obscures the holding in Perkins. 30
As a result of the footnote, plaintiffs might argue that offensive
passing-on is permissible in Robinson-Patman Act cases. They
could stress that the majority opinion in Perkins did not limit
passing-on to Perkins' factual setting, 1 3  that passing-on in
127. Id.
128. 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
129. Commentators have labeled the footnote in Illinois Brick highly ambiguous. Antitrust
Law, supra note 48, at 348; see The Supreme Court, supra note 41, at 230. The footnote is
confusing and ambiguous because its wording inaccurately reflects the meaning the Court
intended. The footnote states, "Another situation in which market forces have been su-
perseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct purchaser is owned
or controlled by its customer. Cf. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969); In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 197, 199." 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. But if the indirect
purchaser controls the direct one, as stated by the Court, then passing-on probably will not
occur. Moreover, the cases cited refer to situations where the direct purchaser controlled the
indirect one.
The apparent inaccuracies of the footnote have sparked considerable comment. See
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Oct. 27, 1977, at A-3; The Supreme Court, supra note
41, at 230; Antitrust Law, supra note 47, at 348 (citing telephone conversation with Henry
C. Lind, Ass't Reporter of Decisions (Sept. 23, 1977)).
130. The holding in Perkins is incomplete because it allowed passing-on without directly
addressing the issue. See text accompanying notes 119-31.
131. The majority in Perkins was aware of the dissenters' desire to limit the Court's deci-
sion to allow offensive passing-on to controlled-group situations. The dissenters' stance was
rejected apparently because the majority failed to limit its decision. Total rejection of the
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Robinson-Patman Act cases avoids the pitfalls presented in Sher-
man Act cases, and that the footnote was only exploring possible
exceptions to Sherman Act passing-on rules. Conversely, defen-
dants might argue that when the Court decided Perkins, it was
unfamiliar with the issues raised by offensive passing-on and under-
standably avoided those issues. Consequently, after Illinois Brick
barred offensive passing-on, the Court attempted to conform the
anomalous passing-on rules in Perkins to those in Illinois Brick by
limiting Perkins to its facts. Moreover, Illinois Brick arguably was
an interpretation of section 4 of the Clayton Act, which also applies
to the Robinson-Patman Act. Each of these arguments has merit.
But because a third or fourth-line action would be emasculated by
disallowing proof of passing-on in the plaintiffs competitor's line of
distribution, one should conclude that this footnote in Illinois Brick
was not intended to prohibit passing-on under the Robinson-
Patman Act. Any other interpretation would result in the Supreme
Court dismantling third-line actions, which are sanctioned ex-
pressly by Congress. Consequently, the footnote should be con-
strued only to explore possible exceptions to Sherman Act passing-
on rules in a Robinson-Patman factual situation.
The legislative response to Illinois Brick promises to nullify the
effect of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick on the use of the passing-
on doctrine to establish the causal nexus in price-discrimination
actions. Senator Allen urged that the legislation be limited to price-
fixing cases.' 32 He cited antitrust scholar Frederick Rowe's caveat
that a passing-on bill not limited to price-fixing cases would open
"the door to massive pass-on litigation in areas where substantive
antitrust law is not at all clear."' The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, however, ensured that the proposed legislation would apply to
dissenter's argument, however, is not completely convincing. The Court did state that there
was "no basis in the language or purpose of the Act for immunizing Standard's price discrimi-
nations simply because the product in question passed through an additional formal exchange
before reaching the level of Perkins' actual competitor." 395 U.S. at 648. The Court's use of
the word "formal" can be interpreted as acknowledging that the basis of this opinion was that
the product passed between related companies. See generally Comment, Trade Regula-
tion-Price Discrimination, 68 MICH. L. REv. 773, 777-79 (1970).
132. S. REP. No. 934, supra note 55, at 53.
133. Id. (citing Proposed Amendments to Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Hearings on S. 1874
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1977) (statement of Frederick Rowe) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Amendments]).
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price-discrimination cases by expressly rejecting Senator Allen's
limitation.
In their rejection of Senator Allen's position, however, neither the
House nor the Senate Judiciary Committees demonstrated that
they understood the impact of the amendment on the Robinson-
Patman Act. One aide to the Senate committee admitted that he
was unable to find any cases brought under Robinson-Patman by
an indirect purchaser.'34 Moreover, counsel for the House committee
explained that the legislation was aimed primarily at the Sherman
Act and that the Robinson-Patman Act was only tangentially a
target. 35 Consequently, the House committee did not explore the
legislation's possible effects on passing-on under the Robinson-
Patman Act. Counsel concluded that the legislation would return
Robinson-Patman passing-on to its pre-Illinois Brick status, what-
ever that was. 13
Although the legislation will reverse Illinois Brick, its effect will
probably be more complex than simply to return the passing-on
doctrine to a pre-Illinois Brick state.'37 The legislation arguably
could restrict passing-on under the Robinson-Patman Act. In the
Perkins' situation the plaintiff would not have to prove that the high
price was passed to him because he purchased directly from the
violator; however, he must prove that the low price was passed to
his indirect purchasing competitor. Defendant's counsel could argue
that the proposed legislation does not enable a price-discrimination
plaintiff to prove passing-on to his competitor. The amendment
states that "the fact that a [plaintiff] or the United States has not
dealt directly with the defendant shall not bar or otherwise limit
recovery.' 38 Interestingly, the amendment does not state that the
plaintiffs recovery shall not be barred because a plaintiffs competi-
tor has not dealt directly with the defendant. In other words, the
amendment allows proof of passing-on in the plaintiff's line of dis-
tribution, which benefits Sherman Act plaintiffs, but does not ex-
plicitly allow proof of passing-on in the plaintiffs competitor's line
134. Proposed Amendments, supra note 133, at 265 (letter from Daniel Berger).
135. Telephone conversation with Tom Runge, Counsel for House of Representatives Judi-
ciary Committee (June 21, 1978).
136. Id.
137. See Note, Recovery By Indirect Purchasers: Illinois Brick and the Congressional
Response, 39 U. PnT. L. REv. 537, 558-59 (1978).
138. S. REP. No. 934, supra note 55, at 36. See also note 58 supra.
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of distribution, which is crucial to the third or fourth-line price-
discrimination actions. If defendant's counsel argues for a strict
interpretation of the amendment and asserts successfully that
Illinois Brick limited the use of passing-on in Perkins to controlled-
group situations, then, except in limited circumstances, price-
discrimination plaintiffs would be unable to sue for price favors
passed on to their indirect purchasing competitors, even if the
amendment becomes law. The better view, however, would permit
proof of passing-on in the competitor's line of distribution, because
a strict interpretation of the amendment would defeat its purpose
of allowing injured parties to use passing-on to prove injury.
Passing-On in Measurement of Damages
In Sherman Act cases, general damages eqtlal to the amount of
the overcharge'39 are presumed, and passing-on is used to apportion
damages among the plaintiffs who may have received a portion of
the overcharge in the vertical chain of distribution.' In Robinson-
Patman Act cases, apportionment of damages is unnecessary be-
cause generally only the direct purchaser may sue. The passing-on
doctrine, however, must be used in a complex manner to measure
loss of profits in the majority of circuits that require proof of conse-
quential damages. In the minority of circuits that presume general
damages are equal to the amount of the discrimination, the use of
passing-on is not complex, and the measurement of damages is not
burdensome. A Senate proposal to measure damages by the pecu-
niary amount of the illicit discrimination would have eliminated the
conflict among the circuits on the measurement of damages under
the Robinson-Patman Act."' The proposal, however, was withdrawn
139. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. At-
lanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
140. See note 82 & accompanying text supra. For other distinctions between the calculation
of damages in Robinson-Patman and Sherman cases, see notes 80-87 supra & accompanying
text.
141. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1936). The report states:
The measure of damages provided in section (d) is the amount of the forbidden
discrimination or allowance found to have been granted, limited however to the
volume of the plaintiff's business in the goods concerned, or to the amount which
he would have received had the allowance been granted to all on the equal basis
which the bill requires. The underlying principle of the bill is the suppression
of unjust discriminations, and it seems both fair and just, and in harmony with
that principle, to enable those victimized by its violation to restore themselves,
through the recovery of damages, to the equal position which they would have
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in conference, not because the committee rejected this damage for-
mula, but because the legislators believed that a damage formula
could best be developed by the courts.1 12
The leading case holding that damages in Robinson-Patman ac-
tions are presumed to be the amount of the discrimination is the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Fowler Manufacturing Co. v. Gorlick. "I
In Fowler, a price-discrimination suit, the district court awarded
damages of three times the amount of the discrimination.1 4 The
defendant appealed, asserting that a general damages award was
not allowed and that the plaintiff had to prove consequential or
special damages to his business, specifically the loss of customers
or profits. The appellate court affirmed, stating that, although the
Supreme Court had not addressed the issue directly, dictum in the
Court's decision in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co. 145 sug-
gested that damages at least equal to the amount of the discrimina-
tion could be presumed without the need for further proof of conse-
quential damages.4  In Fowler the court reasoned that the insupera-
ble difficulties of establishing consequential damages, including the
use of the passing-on doctrine, would impede private enforcement
actions and frustrate deterrence policy.147
occupied had the violation not been committed. Confronting the intending vio-
lator, as it also does, with the prospect that he will be liable to restore to others
in damages tomorrow the discrimination which he grants to some today, it robs
such arrangements of their business advantage, and so may well be expected to
serve as a wholesome and self-enforcing deterrent against violations of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment which the bill as a whole exemplifies.
Id. at 8.
142. H. R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936); see Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947); Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 460 (2d
Cir. 1957).
143. 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970). See also Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945)
(general damage allowed in discriminatory allowance action).
144. 415 F.2d at 1250.
145. 330 U.S. 743 (1947). For an analysis of Bruce's Juices, see notes 151-53 & accompany-
ing text infra.
146. 415 F.2d at 1250-51. The court in Fowler noted that the Supreme Court in Bruce's
Juices had stated, "If the prices are illegally discriminatory, petitioner had been damaged,
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances at least in the amount of the discrimination."
Bruce's Juices, 330 U.S. at 757. Although the statement in Bruce's Juices was dictum, the
court in Fowler regarded the dictum as "a considered, intended and indicative expression on
the nature of the damage right under the Robinson-Patman Act." 415 F.2d at 1251.
147. 415 F.2d at 1251-52. The court's concern in Fowler parallels that of the Supreme Court
in Illinois Brick.
584
PASSING-ON DOCTRINE
In second-line cases the measurement of damages under the rule
in Fowler equals the difference between the low and high price
granted by the discriminator times the number of units bought. '4"
In third or fourth-line cases damages under the rule in Fowler equal
the difference between the high price and the portion of the low
price that is passed to the competitor times the number of units
bought. For example, if the discriminator grants the purchaser a one
dollar advantage, but the purchaser absorbs fifty cents of the advan-
tage as excess profit margin before selling to the competitor of the
plaintiff, damages are fifty cents times the number of units bought.
Thus, the rule in Fowler uses passing-on theory solely to establish
the price differential received by the competitor.
The consequential damage rule used passing-on theory more ex-
tensively in the complex task of establishing loss of profits as re-
flected in either a loss of profit margin or loss of sales. The leading
case holding that damages in Robinson-Patman Act private enforce-
ment actions are restricted to consequential damages is the Second
Circuit's decision in Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co. '49 In
Enterprise, a second-line price-discrimination suit, the district
court allowed general damages of three times the amount of the
discrimination. 5 ' The defendant appealed, claiming that a price-
discrimination plaintiff must prove actual damages. Judge Learned
Hand, speaking for the appellate court, reversed. Judge Hand dis-
counted the dictum in Bruce's Juices cited in Fowler as precedent
148. Even in the circuits that embrace the general damages rule, application is uncertain.
Theoretically, damages can be calculated by multiplying the discrimination times the quant-
ity of products bought by either the disfavored or favored purchaser. Although this question
has not been answered by mAny courts, Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F.
Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), expressed the better view by holding that damages should be
calculated by multiplying the discrimination times the quantity of products bought by the
favored purchaser. The plaintiff is injured only to the extent of his competitor's actual, not
potential, advantage. Other uncertainties exist in the calculation of general damages. The
measurement of general damages could be viewed as either a ceiling for the plaintiff's possible
recovery, Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d
Cir. 1949), or a floor. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947); Reid v.
Doibleday & Co., 136 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
149. 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). See also Kidd v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1961); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning
Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951); Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 942 (D. Conn. 1966);
State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 202 F. Supp. 768 (D. Ill. 1961); Sano
Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Alexander v. Texas
Co., 165 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958).
150. Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955).
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for granting an award of general damages. In Bruce's Juices the
defendant was injured because it had to pay a five percent higher
price for the cost of the plaintiff's cans than its competitors. 151 Al-
though the defendant breached the sales contract for the cans, it
argued that the plaintiff could recover only in quantum meruit, not
on the price for the discriminatory contract. The defendant feared
that a later antitrust action against the plaintiff would be thwarted
by the difficulty of proving damages. The Supreme Court asserted
in dictum'5 2 that this fear was unfounded: "If the prices are illegally
discriminatory, petitioner has been damaged, in the absence of ex-
traordinary circumstances, at least in the amount of that discrimi-
nation."'53
The court in Enterprise believed that the Supreme Court had
spoken inaccurately. Judge Hand reasoned that damages should
only equal the amount of the discrimination if the injured party
proves that he did not pass-on the overcharge. Hand explained that
in Bruce's Juices the Supreme Court had assumed merely that the
passing-on of the discriminatory portion of the can price did not
occur, presumably because the demand for the canned product was
elastic.'54 According to the rationale of Enterprise, proof of actual
damages could be measured as follows: if the injured party did not
pass-on the overcharge, damages would equal the amount of dis-
crimination; if the injured party passed-on the entire discrimina-
tion, damages would equal the amount of net profits lost from re-
duced sales volume; or if the injured party passed-on only a portion
of the discrimination, damages would be apportioned between the
combination of the two foregoing measures.
The use of passing-on in the consequential damages formula is
even more complex than that foreseen by the court in Enterprise.
Consequential damages depend not only on whether the disfavored
purchaser passes on the price disadvantage, but also on whether the
151. 330 U.S. at 745.
152. The only issue before the Court was whether price discrimination was a defense to a
contract action.
153. 330 U.S. at 757.
154. 240 F.2d at 459. Judge Hand's analysis of Bruce's Juices was inaccurate. If the Su-
preme Court had intended to qualify its articulated damage rule in Bruce's Juices with the
passing-on restriction, it would have so decided rather than holding that the petitioner was
damaged in an amount at least equal to the measure of the price discrimination. Further-
more, the Court would not assume that the demand for the canned product was elastic and
supply inelastic without expert testimony to that effect.
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favored purchaser passes on the price advantage. Courts have held
in government enforcement actions that competition is not injured
if the favored purchaser does not pass on the purchase price advan-
tage but, instead, retains the favor as excess profit margin.'55 For a
plaintiff to have a claim, the favored purchaser must pass on at least
a portion of his advantage. The requisite damage, then, is found if
the disfavored purchaser reduces his resale price and loses profits
through lower profit margins, or maintains his price and loses profits
through lower sales.'56 Thus, proof of actual damages in second-line
cases turns on the extent to which the favored purchaser passes the
low price and the extent to which the plaintiff passes the high price.
The calculations are even more complex in third or fourth-line cases
because the plaintiff must prove the extent to which the price ad-
vantage granted by the discriminator was passed to and received by
the competitor.
One commentator has concluded that the difficulty of proving
consequential damages is the most important factor contributing to
the failure of the private enforcement action under the Robinson-
Patman Act as a deterrent to antitrust violations.'15 A plaintiff
should establish with certainty the causal connection between the
violation and his injury.' 8 Passing-on theory allows the plaintiff in
a third or fourth-level action to establish this connection by showing
that his indirect purchasing competitor received the lower price
granted by the discriminator. The price discrimination received by
the indirect purchaser can then be used easily in a calculation of
general damages. Once the injury is proved to have occurred and to
155. Gifford, supra note 111, at 59 n.45. This rule has not been articulated in private
enforcement actions, but the logic applies equally. A disfavored purchaser is not injured if
his competitor makes more profit. The disfavored purchaser is injured only if he makes less
profit. The favored purchaser can effect his competitor adversely only by reducing his resale
price and thereby forcing his competitor to cut his profit margin or reduce sales.
156. Id. at 62-63. If the disfavored purchaser reduces his resale price-that is, does not pass
on the high price-then the damage of lost profits is equal to the discrimination. If he does
not reduce his resale price-that is, he passes on the entire discrimination-then the damage
of lost profits is more complex. In such a situation, lost sales depend upon the elasticity of
demand. If demand is inelastic, no damage results because no sales are lost. A complex
damage calculation arises if the disfavored purchaser passes on only a portion of the discrimi-
nation. His reduction in profit margin is less than the amount of the discrimination, but his
lost sales are less than if he had passed on the entire overcharge.
157. Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman
Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181, 210 (1961).
158. See note 13 supra.
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have resulted from the violation, the precise damage calculation
should not be so complex, unascertainable, and costly that valid
actions are discouraged. The Supreme Court has concurred: "The
rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to
such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages
which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain
in respect of their amount."'' 9
The consequential damage rule, which requires complex proof of
passing-on at the purchase and resale level for both the favored and
disfavored purchaser, leads to theoretical and uncertain calcula-
tions, protracted litigation, and less effective antitrust enforcement.
These were the fears expressed by the Court in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick, and the bar against the passing-on doctrine expressed
in those cases could destroy the consequential damage rule, which
depends on passing-on theory. 60 But legislation overruling Illinois
Brick may resurrect the consequential damage rule and its use of
passing-on because the legislation proclaims that "the defendant
shall be entitled to prove as partial or complete defense to a damage
claim . . . that the plaintiff has passed-on to others . . . what
would otherwise constitute plaintiff's damage."''
A Possible Future Use of Passing-On in the Plaintiff's Line of
Distribution
Two factors prevent indirect purchasers from suing under the
Robinson-Patman Act. Because passing-on is a necessary element
of these suits, Illinois Brick6 2 presumably precludes price-
discrimination actions by indirect purchasers. Although the ration-
ale of Illinois Brick is inapplicable to price-discrimination actions
159. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
160. The holdings in these two cases are applicable directly to the use of passing-on to
measure consequential damages because the fears expressed in the two cases have been
manifested by the history of the consequential damage rule. Other writers agree: "Insofar as
the rule of Enterprise. . . requiring proof of 'consequential damages' is based on the proposi-
tion that a discriminatory price is an overcharge that may have been 'passed on', it would
not seem to survive the Supreme Court's decision in Hanover Shoe .... " ANTITRUST AD-
VISER, supra note 81, at 767. Similarly, Hanover Shoe "raises the question of whether the fact
that a disfavored purchaser passes on his higher prices to his customers immunizes the
supplier from legal liability to that disfavored purchaser." E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN
PRIMER 300-01 (1970).
161. S. REP. No. 934, supra note 55, at 36.
162. See notes 32-66 supra & accompanying text.
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brought by direct purchasers who are injured by competition with
favored indirect purchasers,' 3 it is applicable to actions by indirect
purchasers.' 4
The other obstacle to suits by indirect purchasers under section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is the judicial interpretation of the
statute's language. In Klein v. Lionel Corp., 65 for example, the court
held that the express provisions of this section barred suits by indi-
rect purchasers. The plaintiff had purchased Lionel electric trains
from a wholesaler who purchased from the defendant at a higher
price than Klein's direct purchasing competitors. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit denied standing to the plaintiff, stating
that only direct purchasers are given a cause of action under section
2(a) because the "term purchasers means simply one who pur-
chases, a buyer, a vendee. Klein did purchase Lionel products, but
not [directly] from Lionel."'66
Klein argued that, despite the court's interpretation of section
2(a), he had standing under the indirect purchaser doctrine. This
doctrine states that section 2(a) sanctions an indirect purchaser's
action if the discriminator controls the disfavored price received by
the plaintiff.'7 The Federal Trade Commission has approved the
doctrine since 193765 in the context of cease and desist orders. The
court rejected the doctrine, however, on the basis of the facts in
163. The fear expressed in Illinois Brick that offensive passing-on would result in inconsis-
tent adjudications and multiple liability is inapplicable to direct purchaser suits that use
passing-on to establish only that a price favor was received by an indirect competitor. See
notes 76-77 supra & accompanying text. Similarly, the deterrence rationale of Illinois Brick
would be frustrated if a price discriminator could insulte himself from liability, knowing that
passing-on is barred, by granting price favors to an intermediary who is not in competition
with potential plaintiffs. See notes 78-79 supra & accompanying text.
164. In Illinois Brick the Court reasoned that if more than one plaintiff could bring an
action, then inconsistent adjudications, multiple liability, and protracted litigation would be
as likely to occur in the Robinson-Patman Act context as in the Sherman Act context. These
fears, however, may have been exaggerated by the Court in Illinois Brick. See notes 41, 43,
& 47 supra.
165. 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
166. Id. at 15. Klein was suing under § 3 not § 2(a), but the court construed the term
"purchaser" to be the same under both sections. Id.
167. The requisite control is supplied if the discriminator personally solicits the indirect
purchasing plaintiffs and effectively controls their purchase price, Kraft-Phenix Cheese
Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937); controls their resale price, Luxor Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658, 662-63
(1940); or approves the customers of the intermediary, Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C.
30, 44-45 (1953).
168. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). See also Champion Spark Plug Co.,
50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); Luxor Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940).
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Lionel"9 and questioned its validity in any treble-damage action. 7'
Courts subsequently have approved the use of the indirect pur-
chaser doctrine in treble-damage actions, despite the dictum in
Lionel. '7 Complete offensive passing-on can be assumed in the indi-
rect purchaser doctrine situation because the defendant effectively
controls the terms of the indirect plaintiff's purchase.17 This reason-
ing is analogous to the rationale of the controlled-group exception
to the holding in Illinois Brick. 17 3 Similarly, the rule in Perkins, the
indirect purchaser doctrine, and the controlled-group exception to
the holding in Illinois Brick attempt to -forestall an evasion of the
antitrust laws. 74
Although the indirect purchaser doctrine is a welcome ameliora-
tion of the rule that indirect purchasers cannot sue under the
Robinson-Patman Act, its premise that section 2(a) precludes suits
by indirect purchasers is unsound. The purpose of the Robinson-
Patman Act was to protect independent merchants, many of whom
purchased indirectly from wholesalers, from exploitation by chain
competitors who could demand price concessions. 17 5 The intent of
the Act is frustrated if the beneficiaries of the Act's protection,
indirect purchasing merchants, are denied a cause of action. Indeed,
the judicial interpretation of the Act may conflict with the statutory
language. Section 2(a) protects purchasers but does not specify ei-
ther direct or indirect purchasers. The courts have construed the
statute to embrace direct, but not indirect, purchaser actions. This
169. In Lionel the control exercised by the defendant over the plaintiff's business that
arguably invoked the doctrine was pursuant to the mandate of a fair trade statute. The court
would not use compliance with the statute as a basis for suing Lionel because the purpose of
the statute was to benefit, not injure, the defendant. 237 F.2d at 16.
170. Id. at 15 (without discussion). But cf. K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp.
310, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
171. Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 901 (1969).
172. The difficulties of establishing offensive passing-on may be the unstated reason that
the courts have required the price-discrimination plaintiff to be in privity with the defendant,
although the requirement has been couched in terms of an interpretation of the express
language of § 2(a).
173. See notes 127-31 supra & accompanying text.
174. The Perkins holding prevents a discriminator from avoiding liability by placing an
intermediary between it and the favored customer who is in competition with the plaintiff.
See notes 119-30 supra & accompanying text. The indirect purchaser doctrine prevents a
discriminator from avoiding liability by placing a controlled intermediary between the disfa-
vored customer and him.
175. See note 92 supra & accompanying text.
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is in apparent conflict with the section's prohibition of both direct
and indirect discrimination. 7 1
FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. ,77 expresses the better
view that section 2(a) embraces actions by indirect purchasers re-
gardless of the discriminator's control over the plaintiff's price. In
Collision Parts the district court granted standing to an indirect
purchaser of auto parts, noting that although Perkins did not ad-
dress the indirect purchasing plaintiff issue, Perkins did hold that
section 2(a) should be construed to cover injuries at levels of distri-
bution beyond the level of purchasers from the defendant, at least
in the favored chain of distribution. 7 Collision Parts extended the
coverage of section 2(a) to include injuries at levels of distribution
beyond the level of purchasers from the defendant, at least in the
disfavored chain of distribution. ,79 The indirect purchasing plaintiff,
however, must establish the causal nexus by showing that the high
price granted by the discriminator to the wholesaler was passed to
him. Illinois Brick would probably bar this use of passing-on; but if
the interpretation of section 2(a) in Lionel falls and the rule in
Illinois Brick is overruled by the proposed legislation, the use of
offensive passing-on in Robinson-Patman Act cases will be extended
to trace the effects of the high price in the disfavored line of distribu-
tion and allow actions by indirect purchasing plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Passing-on is a crucial element in establishing injury-in-fact and
the amount of damage in the traditional price-discrimination cause
of action. The plaintiff in a third or fourth-line suit, must prove
injury-in-fact by showing that a price favor was passed to his indi-
rect purchasing competitor. Passing-on also is used to establish
damages in a second, third, or fourth-line action requiring conse-
quential damages or in a third or fouth-line suit requiring general
damages. Despite the implicit role passing-on has played in past
price-discrimination litigation, the future use of passing-on in this
context is uncertain because of the Supreme Court's disallowance
of passing-on in Sherman Act adjudication.
176. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
177. 406 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
178. Id. at 238.
179. Id.
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Because Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick abolished passing-on in
a Sherman Act context, there is a danger that courts will apply
summarily the rule in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe to Robinson-
Patman Act cases. Commentators have argued that Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick eliminated consequential damages in price-
discrimination suits because this damage measure requires passing-
on analysis. Moreover, footnote sixteen in Illinois Brick, which cited
the controlled-group factual setting in the Robinson-Patman action
in Perkins as an example of a possible exception to the rule that
passing-on could not be used in Sherman Act cases, may have been
designed to mesh Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act passing-
on rules by implying that passing-on was only allowed in Perkins
because of the case's unique facts.
A summary application of the rule in Illinois Brick to Robinson-
Patman actions, however, is misguided. The legal and economic
characteristics of passing-on used in actions brought under price-
discrimination law are unique. Passing-on used in a Robinson-
Patman Act suit to establish that a price favor was passed to a
plaintiff's indirect purchasing competitor should not be equated
with passing-on used in a Sherman action to establish that a plain-
tiff received an overcharge. Passing-on in the former context does
not create multiple liability. Moreover, failure to permit passing-on
in the Robinson-Patman Act context would insulate violators from
liability to direct purchasers who are injured by indirect purchas-
ing competitors; in the Sherman Act context, violators could be
insulated only from liability to an indirect, but not a direct, plain-
tiff. On the other hand, the second use of passing-on in Robinson-
Patman Act cases-in consequential damage measurement-
unduly protracts and complicates a plaintiff's case. As a result,
proof of consequential damages, with its attendant use of passing-
on, is inconsistent with the rationale of Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick.
Although the future status of Robinson-Patman Act passing-on is
uncertain, the passing-on controversy in the Sherman Act context
has assured that Robinson-Patman Act passing-on will receive in-
creasing judicial attention. With more analysis, it is hoped that the
courts will not apply summarily Sherman Act passing-on rules to
Robinson-Patman Act cases.
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